Introduction A state's national security strategy ii offers a window onto its core objectives. The military instrument of national power focuses on ways to achieve those objectives through the application of military power. Thus, the emphasis a state places on developing its military capabilities normally reflects the significance it places on attaining those objectives.
It is from this premise that the theater strategic significance of the People's
Republic of China's (China) development of a theater ballistic missile (TBM) capability and its impact on East Asia-Pacific regional security will be discussed. A mature Chinese TBM capability, without a countervailing U.S. and allied TBM capability and TBM Defense (TBMD), may alter the balance of power that underwrites the status quo in the region, and provide China with a perceived 'window of opportunity' to achieve its objectives and establish itself as a dominant regional power. Such dominance may allow China to consolidate claims over strategically significant islands and maritime areas.
China's growing military power offers "an array of potential challenges" iii to
China's neighbors, the United States and its allies. While some commentaries may downplay China's intentions because of its retrograde symmetrical military capabilities with the United States, this paper argues that the emerging ballistic missile capabilities may create significant asymmetrical opportunities for China to shape the regional security environment to its liking and diminish U.S. influence in the region. That said, this paper offers Theater Security Cooperation measures that the Commander, U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM) may consider to mitigate these challenges.
This paper begins by describing China's regional goals and intentions through a discussion of sovereignty tenets and claims, and security drivers. It then looks at China's asymmetric military capabilities and potential employment with special emphasis on its emerging TBM assets. Following that, the paper turns to potential U.S. theater strategic and operational shaping and response options. The final section explores the United
States' desired end-state and the mechanisms that PACOM could employ to achieve and maintain that end-state. The paper concludes that China's emergent TBM capability may very well foster a fundamental shift in China's resolve to seek satisfaction of its sovereignty claims through military means. PACOM's interaction and dialogue with China through theater security contacts become even more imperative.
China's Regional Goals and Intentions
This section discusses those objects that China values and, as the evidence shows, has been willing to use force and/or military coercion to defend in order to extend its interest in the maritime realm of PACOM's AOR. Beijing's security drivers focus on those objects that emphasize its sovereignty and recognition of its maritime claims.
Based on the growth of China's TBM capability, Beijing may be entering a 'window of opportunity' whereby the lack of TBMD may allow attainment of its national objects.
To appreciate the emphasis Beijing places on its sovereignty, it is critical to reflect briefly on China's core national objectives. As one scholar states, "[i]f one were to distill all of the statements of China's national security objectives, both specific and implicit, that have been publicly declared or adduced over the last few years they could be distilled to three simple words: sovereignty, modernity, and stability." iv (emphasis in the original) For China, as a consequence of the occupation of its territory and foreign dominance of politics and economy within living memory, sovereignty as a national goal may surpass all other concerns. Thus, the supporting national goals of modernity and stability will not be developed here, except to note that ensuring access to the South China Sea's potentially rich oil and natural gas resources also is an important security driver that enables self sufficiency and economic growth, and further emphasizes sovereignty and territorial integrity.
China's concept of sovereignty, interestingly, goes much farther than traditional concepts of "freedom from external control." v This expansive view vi includes:
1) reuniting with China those territories claimed by Beijing;
2) settling land border disputes and demarcations for maritime areas;
3) eliminating intrusive foreign interference with internal social and political matters; and, 4) abating international influence on Beijing to enter into multilateral agreements wherein China's freedom of action might be restricted.
China's intense fixation on sovereignty offers some insight into why Beijing might use military force to achieve its goals. The latter incident prompted demands from Beijing for the cessation of U.S.
surveillance flights over Chinese territory. Based on Chinese concepts of sovereignty, such incursions into areas that China views as national territory are greeted with incessant warnings from Beijing over foreign interference in China's domestic affairs.
China further used military exercises and training to press regional interests. Addressing force employment options, China focuses on how to defeat a superior naval force without developing a corresponding symmetrical fleet. Potential options are shore-based missiles and aircraft, torpedoes launched from submarines and small patrol boats and speedboats, and focused attacks on naval logistics.
xlviii China also has a range of options based on her ballistic missile force. China's ballistic missile inventory has grown rapidly, in quantity and sophistication, as compared to her conventional weapon inventory.
xlix Table 2 provides a listing of the characteristics of the theater ballistic missiles China has in service.
Beijing's TBM force offers regional predominance that can be used for deterrence, leverage or intimidation to shape the regional theater. Coercion offers extremely low cost as it is likely to meet with only a limited, passive response from the as it has the potential to provide debilitating consequences if effective.
Potential U.S Theater Policy, Strategy and Operational Options
Given the value that Beijing and the Chinese people place on objectives that run counter to US interests in the region, and the potential utility of TBM in pursuing these More concrete options would include hardening the C4I systems of U.S. and alliance partners based on indications that these components would be targeted for attack.
Additionally, the U.S. and Taiwan would benefit from an investment in enhanced minesweeping capabilities and advanced antisubmarine warfare assets (P-3s).
lxxiii Another option would be to reflag Taiwanese commercial carriers, similar to the reflagging of Kuwait tankers in the Gulf, to raise the consequences should China interfere with Taiwanese economic livelihood.
The most persuasive response to China's emerging TBM systems is to employ a TBMD. This is also the response that generates the most controversy. The issue, cast from China's frame of reference, is that it is a U.S. TBM defense system that would destabilize security in the region, not China's maturing offensive TBM. Without a deployed TBMD, U.S. allies will be forced to construct their own defenses -building their own TBMD systems and/or increasing their ballistic missile inventory -with the consequent lack of confidence in U.S. defense commitments. lxxiv The Pentagon notes that "ballistic missiles … provide a military capability that has the greatest potential to put U.S. forward-based forces at risk and to threaten U.S. allies and friends." lxxv Therefore, the United States has decided on the necessity to deploy TBMD to protect forward deployed U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific-Region. lxxvi TBM as a new metric in determining relative military power must be addressed and (where necessary) countered.
It must be taken seriously throughout DoD, and in our regional security arrangements. While the resolutions to many of these areas are policy questions and decisions that are beyond the authority of PACOM, nonetheless, there are several concrete actions that the U.S. Navy and PACOM can take in the near to mid-term to enhance our ability to respond to the challenges posed by Chinese ambitions and TBM capabilities.
PACOM's Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) lxxxii Strategy --Or How To Obtain The Desired End-State
This final section explores avenues available to PACOM to shape lxxxiii the East Asia-Pacific region in light of China's asymmetrical TBM capability. First, the desired end-state will be discussed in terms of the consequences of inaction and the benefits of prolonging the status quo in the relationship between China and Taiwan. Then, this section offers suggestions to obtain and maintain that desired end-state.
The consequences of inaction, or failure to match defense to offense, are tangible.
China, through her increasing TBM inventory, is experiencing growth in her "comprehensive national power. we should endeavor to convince Beijing that resort to force or coercion to achieve its objectives will be prohibitively costly and any capabilities that they do or will possess are insufficient to the task. x Taiwan Relations Act, U. S. Code, Title 22, sec. 3302a (1979) , states that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." . Mr. Pike notes that "the South China Sea region is the world's second busiest international sea lane" that is transited by "half of the world's supertanker traffic." Additionally, China's continued economic expansion will depend on access to higher levels of oil -such demand is estimated to increase to "more that double current consumption levels -by 2020." Ibid.
xv United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, articles 3, 55-75, and 121. Article 3 establishes the territorial sea breadth of a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles. Articles 55-75, defining the exclusive economic zone, provide sovereign rights to coastal states to explore and exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources of the waters above the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil. Article 121 provides that rocks that cannot sustain human habitation shall generate no exclusive economic zone. Likewise, the security zone that China declared in Article 13 within her contiguous zone is inconsistent with the juridical limits the Law of the Sea Convention authorizes for that zone. In China's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf Act, June 1998, China claims the right to broad powers to enforce laws in the EEZ. Based on actions taken with respect to U.S. aircraft operating within China's EEZ, China appears not to recognize the airspace above her EEZ as international airspace and has interfered with and protested U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in the EEZ. 
